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Case Note
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE JUDGMENT ON THE
PAPER MILL PERMIT DISPUTE
BETWEEN ARGENTINA AND
URUGUAY RECOGNIZES THE
REQUIREMENT OF
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
ASSESSMENT IN A
TRANSBOUNDARY CONTEXT
On 20 April 2010, the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) made its judgment1 public in a case that Argentina
brought against Uruguay in 2006. Argentina contested
Uruguay’s decision to allow the construction of a highly
polluting paper mill on the Uruguay River which
borders the two countries without following proper
consultative procedures. Argentina claimed that pollu-
tion from the mill in question would cause serious envi-
ronmental damage and that it was being erected in
breach of the 1975 Border Treaty on the Statute of the
River Uruguay (the Statute).2
The ICJ ruled that the paper mill in question could
remain in operation despite the fact that Uruguay vio-
lated the treaty when granting the permit for construct-
ing the plant. The ICJ found that Uruguay had breached
its obligation to inform Argentina of its plans to build
pulp mills. But the ICJ decided also that Uruguay did
not breach its substantive obligation to Argentina to
protect the environment under the 1975 Treaty as the
ICJ determined that Argentina had not clearly proved
that the paper mill in question was causing harm to the
river.
This case is only the second pure environmental dispute
to be heard at the ICJ, the first being back in the 1990s.3
SOME FACTS AND ISSUES
AT STAKE
This case illustrates the difficult and sensitive balance
between environmental protection requirements and
economic development objectives. The dispute started
in 2005 when Uruguay authorized the Botnia company
of Finland to build a pulp mill on the banks of the
Uruguay River. This important regional river runs for
1800 kilometres and has a basin of 339,000 square
kilometres, an area bigger than California and double
the size of Great Britain. The river drains about 210,000
square miles of farmland and the agricultural runoff.
The runoff is known to include chemicals from fertiliz-
ers along with heavy metals from factories. The pollut-
ing factories are known to be mostly on the Argentine
side of the river. The pulp mills were sited in Uruguay
chiefly because of the availability of wood pulp supplied
by the conversion of Uruguay’s original grasslands to
industrial Eucalyptus forests, at the rate of about 1.5%
of the total area of Uruguay between 1969 and 1999.4
Scientists say that Argentina and Uruguay could have
done more to reduce river pollution from other sources,
despite their long political battle over the paper mill. It
was also said that Uruguay relied on studies paid for by
the paper company and accepted by the national envi-
ronmental regulator DINAMA, which found that the
plant’s emissions had no measurable impact on the
river. Regarding environmental concerns, a Green-
peace official once said that the disagreement between
Argentina and Uruguay involved a lot of hypocrisy
because there had not been a serious and ongoing
evaluation of pollution in the Uruguay River, either in
Uruguay or in Argentina.5
The project involved the construction of a US$1.2
billion cellulose factory at Fray Bentos, a town with a
population of 23,000 people. The project is situated 25
kilometres from the Argentine town of Gualeguaychú, a
popular tourist resort town of 80,000 residents on the
Argentine side of the river. The project – the largest
single foreign investment in Uruguay’s history – was
aimed to reinvigorate an area devastated by the collapse
of its beef-processing industry. New mills were
expected to generate around 8000 jobs and increase
1 ICJ 20 April 2010, Argentina v. Uruguay (Pulp Mills on the River
Uruguay) (not yet reported), available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/
docket/files/135/15877.pdf>.
2 Treaty on the Statute of the River Uruguay (Salto, 26 February
1975), available at <http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/10/4/
00018191.pdf>.
3 ICJ 25 September 1997, Hungary v. Slovakia (Gabcˇíkovo-
Nagymaros Project), [1997] ICJ Rep. 78, 37 ILM 162 (1998). In that
case, the ICJ found that Hungary was not entitled to terminate a treaty
based on grave environmental concerns, even though Czechoslova-
kia had begun major works to divert the Danube River in violation of
that treaty.
4 C.R. Payne, ‘Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay: The International
Court of Justice Recognizes Environmental Impact Assessment as a
Duty under International Law’, 14:9 ASIL Insights (22 April 2010),
available at <http://www.asil.org/files/insight100422pdf.pdf>.
5 S. Hager, ‘ICJ Decision on Uruguay/Argentina River Factory
Case’, Impunity Watch (21 April 2010) available at <http://
impunitywatch.com/?p=10332>.
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gross domestic product by 1.6%.6 But on both sides of
the Uruguay River, citizens became worried about
dioxin, furan, and other pulp plant pollutants harming
fish, birds, honeybees, and fruit crops.7 Although
Uruguay stood to benefit economically by the project,
the Argentine people expected no economic benefit, but
rather costs, as they feared harm to agriculture, fisher-
ies, real estate, (eco)tourism and employment.
Another economic (development) dimension of this
project concerned its multilateral financial engineer-
ing.8 On 21 November 2006, the boards of directors of
the International Finance Corporation (IFC) and the
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)
approved a US$170 million investment by the IFC and
a guarantee of up to US$350 million from MIGA for
construction of the pulp mill. Non-governmental orga-
nizations (NGOs) and community groups (the Argen-
tine NGO Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente
(CEDHA) in particular) objected to the project financ-
ing. It was argued that the IFC andMIGAwere violating
their voluntary commitments under the Equator Prin-
ciples.9 As this resulted in one lender pulling out of the
project, CEDHA was allowed to submit a formal com-
plaint to the IFC through its compliance procedure.
CEDHA also filed a complaint against Uruguay with the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and ini-
tiated lawsuits in Argentina and Uruguay. These NGO
actions however did not result in successful outcomes
for those groups.
CHRONOLOGY OF
DEVELOPMENTS AND STEPS
IN THE DISPUTE10
In 2003, Uruguay authorized the Spanish firm Ence to
build a paper plant on the Uruguay River. The Argen-
tine government said it was monitoring the plan.
In February 2005, Uruguay authorizedMetsa-Botnia to
build another plant near the planned Ence plant. In
September 2005 CEDHA submitted its first complaint
to the Compliance Advisor Ombudsman (CAO) of the
IFC. As noted by CEDHA:
IFC, which collected and guided information about the
projects’ social and environmental compliance, had to send
Botnia back to the drawing board several times, following an
unfavorable verdict from its Compliance Advisory Ombuds-
man (the CAO) who found the project seriously violated the
IFC’s procedural norms and safeguards.11
In December 2005, Argentine environmentalists in the
town of Gualeguaychú began sporadic blockades of an
international bridge across the river, to protest about
the plant. In the same month, a World Bank prelimi-
nary report declared that emissions from the plant
would be safe. The project was then the subject of a
number of meetings between the countries’ foreign
ministers and a High-Level Technical Group in 2005
and 2006.12
As early as January 2006, Argentina announced its
intention to file proceedings against Uruguay before the
ICJ. This happened amidst rising tensions between the
two riparian States and demands from local residents
and activists to halt the project. In March 2006, the
paper companies suspended construction work and
protesters lifted a highway blockade as the Presidents of
both countries announced that negotiations would be
held. However as these talks failed, enraged Argentine
6 The Argentine non-governmental organization Centro de Derechos
Humanos y Ambiente states that Botnia operates in an entirely tax
free zone, exports all of its production for European and Asian con-
sumption, and employs only 300 people. See Centro de Derechos
Humanos y Ambiente, ICJ Rules on Pulp Mill Case: World Bank’s
IFC, Nordea, Calyon and Finnvera Complicit in Violations of Interna-
tional Law’ (20 April 2010), available at <http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/
more_information/icj-rules.php>.
7 ‘A Paper Settlement: A Ruling by the International Court of Justice
Should End a Nasty Dispute’, The Economist (22 April 2010). See
also P.H.F. Bekker, ‘Argentina-Uruguay Environmental Border
Dispute Before the World Court’, 10:11 ASIL Insights (16 May 2006),
available at <http://www.asil.org/insights_2006.cfm>, who states
‘. . . The project consists of two greenfield eucalyptus Kraft pulp mills
using Elemental Chlorine Free (ECF) technology to produce air-dried
pulp (ADP). ADP is the primary raw material for the production of
paper and paper-related products. In contrast to the Totally Chlorine
Free (TCF) bleaching process, ECF technology results in the emis-
sion of dioxins through the use of chlorine dioxide. The plants will
produce a combined total of about 1.4 million tons of pulp annually’.
See also L. Egan, ‘Argentina, Uruguay Split over Planned Pulp Mills’,
Washington Post (14 August 2005), at A16. Regarding the negative
impact of Eucalyptus cultivation in Uruguay, see K. Donovan, ‘A
Beneficial Uruguayan Pulp Mill: Pulp Fiction?’, Council on Hemi-
spheric Affairs (30 January 2007), available at <http://www.coha.org/
a-beneficialuruguayan-paper-mill-pulp-fiction/>.
8 The private investors include Nordea (a Swedish private bank),
Calyon (French Credit Lyonnais) and Finnvera (the Finnish State-
owned Export Credit Agency). The Dutch bank, ING, decided to pull
US$480 million in financing following a verdict by the IFC’s Compli-
ance Advisory Ombudsman, which agreed with the local community
on alleged violations of the project of the IFC’s Social and Environ-
mental Safeguards. See Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente,
n. 6 above.
9 Ibid. The Equator Principles aim to improve social and environmen-
tal impacts of project financing, but as this case seems to illustrate,
their strength and real impact is linked to the role of NGOs in their
implementation. See F. Amalric, The Equator Principles: A Step
Towards Sustainability?, CCRS Working Paper, No 01/05
(University of Zurich, January 2005), 20, available at <http://
www.humanrights.ch/home/upload/pdf/050726_equatorprinciples_
uniZH2005.pdf>.
10 This description is based on information available on several web-
sites, see, inter alia, C. Hornos and P. Simao, ‘Chronology – Argen-
tine, Uruguay Dispute Pulp Mill’, Reuters (20 April 2010), available at
<http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN209920420100420?type=
marketsNews>; and D. Taillant, Paper Pulp Mills Uruguay
(CEDHA, undated), available at <http://www.cedha.org.ar/en/
initiatives/paper_pulp_mills/more_information.php>.
11 See Centro de Derechos Humanos y Ambiente, n. 6 above.
12 See Argentina v. Uruguay, n. 1 above, para. 40.
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environmentalists in Gualeguaychú blocked several
bridges between the two countries in April 2006. This
caused cargo and tourist traffic to make a 60-mile
detour and economic harm to Uruguay. After months of
unsuccessful negotiation with Uruguay, on 4May 2006,
Argentina submitted its dispute to the ICJ along with a
request for provisional measures. Argentina claimed
two substantive rights: (1) Uruguay had to prevent pol-
lution and also to prescribe pollution control measures
in accordance with international standards; and (2)
suspending the construction of pulp mills was neces-
sary to preserve Argentina’s rights because the poten-
tial damage as a result of mill operations (harm to
public health and the river environment) could not be
compensated by financial means. In its application,
Argentina claimed that Uruguay, by unilaterally autho-
rizing the construction of paper mills, had violated the
Treaty on the Statute of the River Uruguay.13 This treaty
between Argentina and Uruguay was concluded in
1975 to establish ‘the joint machinery necessary for
the optimum and rational utilization of the River
Uruguay’.14
Soon after the oral proceedings on the provisional mea-
sures in June 2006, the ICJ decided in its Order of 13
July 2006 that provisional measures were not required
under the circumstances and rejected Argentina’s peti-
tion to block construction of the plants.15 The ICJ stated
that it was not convinced that procedural breaches or
continued construction of such mills would lead to any
harm that could not be reversed later if Argentina pre-
vailed on the merits. The ICJ also reminded both
parties of their obligations under international law and
the Treaty on the Statute of the River Uruguay to
consult, cooperate, and refrain from making resolution
of the dispute more difficult.16 It further reminded
Uruguay of its offer to conduct joint monitoring with
Argentina.
On 6 September 2006, the Mercosur ad hoc arbitration
tribunal did not require Argentina to put an end to the
bridge blockades, as requested by Uruguay. Uruguay
had initiated a complaint under the procedures of the
Mercosur common market.17 However this tribunal –
an ad hoc assembly formed by three arbiters (one
Argentine, one Uruguayan and one Spanish) –found
these blockades were not compatible with Argentina’s
Mercosur obligations to guarantee free circulation of
goods and services.18 The Mercosur panel acknowl-
edged that a State can only be partially responsible for
the actions of its protesting citizens, and that a commit-
ment to non-violent government action is to be sup-
ported and respected. The panel concluded that too
much inaction on the part of the State can be seen as
tacit support for the protestors and therefore a violation
of its commitment to open commerce. But the panel did
not require Argentina to ensure blockade cessation,
stating that it had no reason to believe that Argentina
had ‘wrongful intent’.19
As a result, Uruguay decided to ask the ICJ for provi-
sional measures to lift the blockades. Also in Septem-
ber 2006, as a result of continuous pressure from
environmentalists, Spain’s Ence withdrew its plans,
and its planned plant was relocated in 2006 to a loca-
tion mutually agreed on by both Uruguay and Argen-
tina. In October 2006, the World Bank reported that
the plants met environmental standards, and in
November the IFC granted US$370 million to Botnia’s
‘Orion’ project.
By its Order of 23 January 2007, the ICJ rejected Uru-
guay’s petition to force Argentina to end the road-
blocks.20 Uruguay’s request was denied by the ICJ on
the grounds that the construction of the plant was pro-
gressing significantly, and there was no imminent risk
that Uruguay’s rights might be irreparably harmed.21
In July 2007, talks mediated by Spain’s king also did
not generate a resolution to the conflict. On 13 Novem-
ber 2007, the IFC released reports from two indepen-
dent external consultants that indicated that Botnia’s
Orion pulp mill was ready to operate in accordance
with IFC’s environmental and social requirements and
international best available technology (BAT) stan-
dards. The IFC also provided an updated Environmen-
tal and Social Action Plan (ESAP), reflecting the status
of Botnia’s compliance with the issues to be addressed
as a condition of the IFC financing of the project. The
reports and updated ESAP confirmed that the Orion
pulp mill would generate major economic benefits for
Uruguay and would not cause harm to the environ-
ment. Soon after the Botnia plant started up in
November 2007, strong smells from the plant pro-
voked complaints. So it was hardly surprising that the
newly elected Argentine President Cristina Fernandez
complained of the Botnia plant during her swearing-in
speech in December 2007.
13 Treaty on the Statute of the River Uruguay (Salta, 26 February
1975).
14 Ibid., Article 1.
15 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional
Measures, Order of 13 July 2006, [2006] ICJ Rep. 113.
16 Treaty on the Statute of the River Uruguay, n. 13 above, Article 7.
17 Treaty between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay. Establishing
a Common Market [Mercado Comun del Sur or Mercosur] (Asuncion,
26 March 1991). The signing of the Olivos Protocol on 18 February
2002 (entered into force on 1 January 2004) made the creation of
arbitration and review tribunals possible.
18 Decision of the Mercosur Ad Hoc Arbitral Tribunal (Uruguay v.
Argentina) (6 September 2006).
19 C. Granger, ‘The Role of International Tribunals in Natural
Resource Disputes in Latin America’, 28 Ecology Law Quarterly
(2008), 1342.
20 During the following years environmentalists and community
groups in Gualeguaychu, Argentina, maintained almost a permanent
blockade of a bridge between Uruguay and Argentina.
21 Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Provisional
Measures, Order of 23 January 2007, at 3.
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On 19 March 2009, the IFC publicly released an envi-
ronmental monitoring report for Botnia’s Orion pulp
mill covering the first full calendar year (2008) of the
mill’s operation since its start.22 On 5 August, the Envi-
ronmental Civic Assembly of Gualeguaychú, an Argen-
tine community group, submitted a second complaint
to the IFC Compliance Advisor /Ombudsman (CAO)
alleging that environmental monitoring of the now-
operational pulp mill was inadequate, and that it was
causing odours, air emissions, water pollution, impacts
to community health and trans-boundary issues. After
an assessment by the Ombudsman that included a
review of the status of the case ‘in other international
fora’, the CAO released its appraisal on 15 March 2010
and determined that the IFC had taken the necessary
steps, and there were no grounds for further auditing or
other action.23
Before the ICJ case, on 15 July 2009, each of the parties,
as provided for in the agreement between them and
with the authorization of the ICJ, submitted comments
on the new documents produced by the other party.
Public hearings in the case were held between 14 Sep-
tember and 2 October 2009.
On 19 April 2010, the day before the ICJ ruling, the IFC
released its latest environmental monitoring report for
UPM’s Orion pulp mill24 covering the second full calen-
dar year (2009) of the mill’s operation.25 It confirmed
that themill was performing to the air and water quality
standards projected in the Cumulative Impact Study
and Environmental Impact Assessment, as required by
IFC, and within the limits established by the environ-
mental permits issued by DINAMA.
SOME FEATURES AND ELEMENTS
OF THE ICJ’S RULING
Summarized Findings by the ICJ
By 13 votes to one, the ICJ found that Uruguay had
breached its procedural obligations under Articles 7–12
of the 1975 Statute of the River Uruguay and that the
declaration by the Court of this breach constituted
appropriate satisfaction. By 11 votes to three, the Court
further found that Uruguay had not breached its sub-
stantive obligations under Articles 35, 36 and 41 of the
1975 Statute of the River Uruguay. The ICJ unani-
mously rejected all other submissions by the parties.
In its judgment, the ICJ considered:
that its finding of wrongful conduct by Uruguay in respect of
its procedural obligations per se constitutes a measure of
satisfaction for Argentina. As Uruguay’s breaches of the pro-
cedural obligations occurred in the past and have come to an
end, there is no cause to order their cessation.26
At paragraph 273, the Court referred to its decision
in the Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/
Slovakia) case27 and recalled also Articles 34–37 of the
International Law Commission Articles on the Respon-
sibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts.28
Indeed, given the content of its Order of 13 July 2006
declaring that provisional measures were unnecessary
and by such allowing the further construction of the
pulp mills, the ICJ had limited the potential impact of
its future judgment. However, it had not limited itself
completely as Article 37 allows for satisfaction in cases
where the injury cannot be remediated by restitution or
compensation.29 In their dissenting opinion Judges
Al-Khasawneh and Simma rejected this ex post
approach as they stated that:
in essence, under Article 12, the Court is not relegated to the
function of adjudging ex post facto whether a breach has
happened and what remedies constitute appropriate repa-
ration for a claimed breach, but instead, is co-opted by the
Parties to assist them from an early stage in the planning
process. The perspective of Article 12 is decisively forward-
looking, as under it, the Court is to step in, before a project
22 The report stated that the mill was performing to the air and water
quality standards projected in the Cumulative Impact Study and Envi-
ronmental Impact Assessment, as required by the IFC, and well
within the limits established by the environmental permits issued by
the Uruguayan regulator, DINAMA. See DINAMA, Environmental
Performance Review. 2008 Monitoring Year (DINAMA, March 2009).
23 For information regarding the complaint, see CAO, Uruguay /
Orion-02/Gualeguaychú-Argentina (15 March 2010), available at
<http://www.cao-ombudsman.org/cases/case_detail.aspx?id=152>.
24 In December 2009, Metsa-Botnia sold its Uruguay pulp plant and
forestry operations to UPM-Kymmene. See UPM-The Biofore
Company, UPM 2009 Annual Report (UPM-The Biofore Company,
2010), at 10, available at <http://www.upm.com/downloads/compinfo/
UPM_AR_09_en_full_online.pdf >.
25 The assessment of operating performance was again prepared by
EcoMetrix Incorporated, an independent environmental consulting
firm. See EcoMetrix, Environmental Performance Review: 2008
Monitoring Year (April 2010), available at <http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/
disclosure.nsf/content/Uruguay_Pulp_Mills>. The report does not
contain any new findings but confirms that the mill is performing to the
air and water quality standards projected in the Cumulative Impact
Study and Environmental Impact Assessment, as required by IFC,
and within the limits established by the environmental permits issued
by the Uruguayan regulator, DINAMA.
26 See Argentina v. Urugua, n. 1 above, para. 269.
27 See Gabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros, n. 3 above, para. 152.
28 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrong-
ful Acts, printed in Report of the International Law Commission on the
Work of Its Fifty-Third Session (UN Doc. A/56/10, 2001), available at
<http://www.un.org/law/ilc>.
29 Ibid., Article 37 clarifies what is to be understood as ‘Satisfaction’:
‘1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under
an obligation to give satisfaction for the injury caused by that act
insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or compensation. 2.
Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an
expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modal-
ity. 3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may
not take a form humiliating to the responsible State’.
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is realized, where there is disagreement on whether there
are potentially detrimental effects to the environment.30
Treaty-Boundary Issues
For the most part, the ICJ decision relies on the 1975
Treaty on the Statute of the River Uruguay. On 26 Feb-
ruary 1975, Argentina and Uruguay signed the Statute
of the River Uruguay entering into force on 18 Septem-
ber 1976. The 1975 Statute’s purpose is to govern all
activity involving natural resources along the river.
Accordingly, the 1975 Statute also established the
Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay
(CARU)31 to regulate and coordinate the works of any
party affecting the river. Under Article 60 of the 1975
Statute, any dispute not settled through negotiation
may be submitted by either party to the ICJ. Argentina’s
claims concerning noise and visual pollution, and those
concerning ‘bad odours’ produced by the Botnia mill,
do not fall within the ICJ’s jurisdiction because they do
not relate to ‘the interpretation or application’ of the
1975 Statute, within the meaning of Article 60 of that
instrument.32
The ICJ did not interpret other multilateral environ-
mental agreements, despite an effort by Argentina to
bring them in. The ICJ observed that Article 41(a) of the
Statute, the purpose of which is to protect and preserve
the aquatic environment through the enactment of
rules and the adoption of appropriate measures by each
of the parties in accordance with applicable interna-
tional agreements, ‘does not incorporate international
agreements as such into the 1975 Statute but rather sets
obligations for the parties to exercise their regulatory
powers, in conformity with [these] . . . agreements’.33
The ICJ concluded that the multilateral conventions
relied on by Argentina do not fall within the scope of
Article 60 of the 1975 Statute and that therefore it had
no jurisdiction to rule whether Uruguay has complied
with its obligations thereunder.34
Procedural and Substantial Obligations
Including Sustainable Development and
Environmental Impact Assessments
The ICJ noted that the object and purpose of the 1975
Statute, set forth in Article 1 of that instrument, is for
the parties to achieve ‘the optimum and rational utili-
zation of the River Uruguay’ by means of the ‘joint
machinery’ for cooperation, which originates in the
procedural obligations and the substantive obligations
under the Statute. In this respect, the Court had already
observed in its Order of 13 July 2006, that such use
should allow for sustainable development which takes
account of ‘the need to safeguard the continued conser-
vation of the river environment and the rights of
economic development of the riparian States’.35 In its
final judgment, the ICJ referred to the Gabcˇikovo-
Nagymaros case, where the Court, after recalling that
‘[t]his need to reconcile economic development with
protection of the environment is aptly expressed in the
concept of sustainable development’, added that ‘[i]t is
for the Parties themselves to find an agreed solution
that takes account of the objectives of the Treaty’.36 The
concept of sustainable development was not further
elaborated in the Gabcˇikovo-Nagymaros case. In the
Pulp Mills case, the Court also restricted its position in
a rather repetitive way. It stated that:
[r]egarding Article 27, it is the view of the Court that its
formulation reflects not only the need to reconcile the varied
interests of riparian States in a transboundary context and
in particular in the use of a shared natural resource, but also
the need to strike a balance between the use of the waters
and the protection of the river consistent with the objective
of sustainable development . . . it is the opinion of the Court
that Article 27 embodies this interconnectedness between
equitable and reasonable utilization of a shared resource
and the balance between economic development and envi-
ronmental protection that is the essence of sustainable
development.37
The ICJ noted that the obligation to inform, provided
for in Article 7 of the 1975 Statute, involves the State
which is initiating the planned activity to inform CARU
thereof. This information has to enable CARU to decide
whether or not the plan falls under the cooperation
procedure laid down by the 1975 Statute, but not to
pronounce on its actual impact on the river and the
quality of its waters.38 The obligation to inform must
‘become applicable at the stage when the relevant
authority has had the project referred to it with the aim
of obtaining initial environmental authorization and
before the granting of that authorization’.39
The ICJ observed that ‘the environmental impact
assessments which are necessary to reach a decision on
any plan that is liable to cause significant transbound-
ary harm to another State must be notified by the party
concerned to the other party, through CARU. Such noti-
fication is intended to enable the notified party to par-
ticipate in the process of ensuring that the assessment
is complete, so that it can then consider the plan and its
effects with a full knowledge of the facts (Article 8 of the
30 See Argentina v. Uruguay, n. 1 above, para. 21.
31 See The River Uruguay Executive Commission – Comisión Admin-
istradora del Rio Uruguay (CARU, undated), at 38, available at
<http://www.caru.org.uy/publicaciones/The-River-Uruguay-
executive-commission-Uruguay-Paysandu.pdf >.
32 See Argentina v. Uruguay, n. 1 above, para. 52.
33 Ibid., para. 62.
34 Ibid., para. 63.
35 Provisional Measures, n. 15 above, para. 80.
36 ICJ 25 September 1997, Hungary v. Slovakia (Gabcíkovo-
Nagymaros Case), [1994] ICJ Rep. 151, paras 140–141.
37 See Argentina v. Uruguay, n. 1 above, para. 177.
38 Ibid., para. 104.
39 Ibid., para. 105.
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1975 Statute).40 This notification must take place before
the State concerned decides on the environmental
viability of the plan. The ICJ observed that, in the
present case, ‘the notification to Argentina of the envi-
ronmental impact assessments did not take place
through CARU, and that Uruguay only transmitted
those assessments to Argentina after having issued the
initial environmental authorizations for the twomills in
question.41 So Uruguay failed to comply with its obliga-
tion to notify the plans to Argentina through CARU
under Article 7 of the 1975 Statute. Argentina also put
arguments forward based on the precautionary prin-
ciple and reversal of the burden of proof. In this regard,
the Court opined ‘that while a precautionary approach
may be relevant in the interpretation and application of
the provisions of the Statute, it does not follow that it
operates as a reversal of the burden of proof’.42
The ICJ’s judgment dealt with issues regarding envi-
ronmental impact assessment (EIA) in paragraphs
203–219. The ICJ noted that for the purposes of com-
plying with their obligations under Article 41 of the 1975
Statute and under general international law, the parties
are obliged, when planning activities which may be
liable to cause transboundary harm, to carry out an
EIA. The ICJ recognized EIA as ‘a practice, which in
recent years has gained so much acceptance among
States that it may now be considered a requirement
under general international law’.43 It found that the
requirement to undertake an EIA is linked to a risk that
the proposed industrial activity may have a significant
adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particu-
lar on a shared resource. It found that there is a require-
ment to apply an EIA as:
due diligence, and the duty of vigilance and prevention
which it implies, would not be considered to have been exer-
cised, if a party planning works liable to affect the regime of
the river or the quality of its waters did not undertake an
environmental impact assessment on the potential effects of
such works.44
So the ICJ not only affirmed States’ international envi-
ronmental obligations but also found that their conduct
may incur responsibility when failing to conduct due
diligence in their environmental impact assessment,
even when, as in this case, the pulp mill was built by a
private corporation, but authorized by a public author-
ity.45 It seemsas if the ICJwanted to recognizeUruguay’s
reference to the International Law Commission’s 2001
draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm
fromHazardousActivities (PTHHA),46 as Article 7 of the
PTHHA Articles on the assessment of risk states that:
Any decision in respect of the authorization of an activity
within the scope of the present articles shall, in particular,
be based on an assessment of the possible transboundary
harm caused by that activity, including any environmental
impact assessment.
The approach of the ILC emphasizes the procedural
duty of prevention and elements of conduct that –
where appropriate – States are expected to take
(including authorization for certain activities, risk
assessment, information to the public, emergency pre-
paredness and notification to, and consultation with,
other States).47
The ICJ stated that not only the 1975 Statute but also
general international law does not specify the scope and
content of an EIA. On the one hand, the ICJ seems to
ignore the existence of the United Nations Economic
Commission for Europe (UNECE) Espoo Convention
on EIA in a Transboundary Context, but, on the other
hand, it acknowledged the fact that both involved States
are not parties to this Espoo Convention,48. From this
formalistic point of view it is interesting that the ICJ
found that the content of an EIAmust be determined by
each State within its domestic legislation or in the
authorization process for the planned activity.49 This
reflects also the balanced judgment in this sensitive
case as the ICJ avoided dictating strict requirements
that might infringe on national sovereignty. But the ICJ
was also clear that an EIA must be conducted prior to
the implementation of a project. Furthermore, once
operations have started and, where necessary, through-
out the life of the project, continuous monitoring of its
effects on the environment has to be undertaken. The
judgment elaborates two specific EIA issues. Regarding
the assessment of the location of the project, the ICJ
recalls that Principle 4(c) of the 1987 Goals and Prin-
ciples of Environmental Impact Assessment of the
United Nations Environment Programme stipulates
that an EIA should include, at a minimum, ‘a descrip-
tion of practical alternatives, as appropriate’.50 Con-
cerning consultation with affected populations, a basic
requirement in the Espoo Convention and the UNECE
Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public
40 Ibid., para. 119.
41 Ibid., para. 121.
42 Ibid., para. 164.
43 Ibid., para. 204
44 Ibid., para. 204.
45 Sun Kim, ‘Environmental Impact Assessments as a Requirement
under General International Law: Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
case, Argentina v. Uruguay’, RightRespect (4 May 2010), available at
<http://www.rightrespect.com/2010/05/04/environmental-impact-
assessment-is-a-requirement-under-general-international-law-pulp-
mills-on-the-river-uruguay-case-argentina-v-uruguay/>.
46 Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Fifty-Third Session, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Fifty-Sixth Session, Supplement (Document A/56/10, 2001), at 157,
available at <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2001/2001report.htm>.
47 T. Scovazzi, ‘State Responsibility for Environmental Harm’, 12
Yearbook of International Environmental Law (2001), 50.
48 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Trans-
boundary Context (Espoo, 25 February 1991).
49 See Argentina v. Uruguay, n. 1 above, para. 105.
50 Ibid., para. 210.
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Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice
in Environmental Matters,51 the ICJ revealed no ambi-
tion at all. Given the non-party status of both involved
States in relationship to the Espoo Convention, the ICJ
simply did not see any legal obligation arising.
This case, as well as theGabcˇíkovo-Nagymaros Project
(Hungary/Slovakia) case, illustrate the huge involve-
ment of experts who produced a variety of (scientific)
reports on behalf of each party. Aimed at providing
factual clarity, the positioning of these non-legal
experts however led to rather unclear effects. In para-
graph 167, the ICJ interestingly stated:
. . . Regarding those experts who appeared before it as
counsel at the hearings, the Court would have found it more
useful had they been presented by the Parties as expert wit-
nesses under Articles 57 and 64 of the Rules of Court,
instead of being included as counsel in their respective del-
egations. The Court indeed considered that those persons
who provide evidence before the Court based on their scien-
tific or technical knowledge and on their personal experi-
ence should testify before the Court as experts, witnesses or
in some cases in both capacities, rather than counsel, so that
they may be submitted to questioning by the other party as
well as by the Court.
This opinion of the Court was not shared by all judges
as Judges Al-Khasawneh and Simma delivered a joint
dissenting opinion which contained an elaborated cri-
tique of the Court’s approach on assessing and weighing
the complex technical evidence as presented by the
parties in this case. Both judges found the Court’s
approach passive and suggested several alternatives in
their dissenting opinion.52 Furthermore they stated
that:
the Court has an unfortunate history of persisting, when
faced with sophisticated scientific and technical evidence in
support of the legal claims made by States before it, in
resolving these issues purely through the application of its
traditional legal techniques; and it has come under consid-
erable criticism in this regard.53
It added that:
The present dispute has been a wasted opportunity for the
Court, in its ‘unfettered discretion’ to do so . . . to avail itself
of the procedures in Article 50 of its Statute and Article 67 of
its Rules, and establish itself as a careful, systematic court
which can be entrusted with complex scientific evidence,
upon which the law (or breach thereof) by a party can be
established.54
CONCLUSION
This ICJ judgment clearly recognizes the importance
and value of EIAs in international environmental law,
both as a procedural and substantial environmental
policy tool. This recognition might strengthen the use
of EIAs in a transboundary context and as such
increase general public knowledge about the Espoo
Convention (and its Protocol on Strategic Environ-
mental Assessment),55 notwithstanding the Court’s
rejection of Argentina’s reference to this convention.
The fact that the possible application of this conven-
tion was raised during this case gave it an exposure
which may increase the awareness about this conven-
tion and its implementation. By linking EIAs to due
diligence requirements, the ICJ has given a clear signal
about the potential impact of EIAs, which incorporates
a basic interrelated trinity: information, consultation
and participation. The history of this case cannot be
ignored. The continuous efforts of non-State actors
have played a major role in the consecutive legal steps.
At first sight this judgment has not brought the envi-
ronmental and human rights activists a victory. Based
on delicate balanced reasoning, the ICJ has safe-
guarded the continued operation of the pulp mill in
Uruguay. Also, the ICJ’s vision on sustainable devel-
opment has not really been further developed in the
judgment: Argentina has been rewarded some moral
gains but the reasoning of the ICJ in this case is not
thoroughly convincing. In that sense this judgment
offers no breakthrough or radical improvements for
the implementation of international environmental
law but rather provides simply guidance for further
diplomatic efforts in cases of problematic transbound-
ary impacts. But even for that kind of work, the Espoo
Convention and its Protocol already offer inspiring
provisions.
Written by: Jan De Mulder, Department of
Public International Law, University of Ghent,
Belgium
51 Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
(Aarhus, 25 June 1998).
52 See Argentina v. Uruguay, n. 1 above, paras 6–8.
53 Ibid., para. 12.
54 Ibid., para. 17.
55 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Espoo
Convention (Kiev, 21 May 2003).
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